United Nations Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013

= Text = United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weaponsin the Syrian Arab Republic

Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascuson 21 August 2013

Note by the Secretary-General

1. In transmitting simultaneously to the Security Council and the General Assembly thereport on the incident which took place on 21 August 2013 in the Ghouta area of Damascus (see annex), the Secretary-General expresses his profound shock and regret atthe conclusion that chemical weapons were used on a relatively large scale, resulting innumerous casualties, particularly among civilians and including many children. TheSecretary-General condemns in the strongest possible terms the use of chemical weaponsand believes that this act is a war crime and grave violation of the 1925 Protocol for theProhibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare and other relevant rules of customary internationallaw. The international community has a moral responsibility to hold accountable thoseresponsible and for ensuring that chemical weapons can never re-emerge as an instrumentof warfare.

2. The Secretary-General wishes to express his deep appreciation to the Head andmembers of the Mission, including the dedicated teams of experts from the Organisationfor the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the World Health Organization. TheSecretary-General is grateful for the support provided by Member States. The Secretary-General counts on the continued support of all concerned until the Mission completes itsinvestigation into all other allegations and submits its final report.

3. The accession of the Syrian Arab Republic on 14 September 2013 to the Convention onthe Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of ChemicalWeapons and on their Destruction is a welcome development. As depositary of theConvention, the Secretary-General has long called for its universality. The Secretary-General welcomes the agreement reached on 14 September 2013 between the RussianFederation and the United States of America on a framework for the elimination of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. He hopes that the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United NationsSecurity Council quickly move to consider and implement this proposal, which is aimedat expediting the fufillment of the obligations of the Syrian Arab Republic under theConvention. The Secretary-General calls upon the Syrian Arab Republic to implementfaithfully all of its disarmament obligations and he stands ready to facilitate internationalefforts aimed at providing assistance in this regard.

4. The Secretary-General reiterates that any use of chemical weapons by anyone underany circumstances is a grave violation of international law. 5. Where there are allegations of the use of chemical weapons, however, the internationalcommunity looks to the United Nations for an impartial and objective determinationwhether, and to what extent, such allegations can be substantiated. It is imperativetherefore that the authority extended to the Secretary-General by the General Assembly(A/RES/42/37 C) and endorsed by the Security Council (S/RES/620 (1988)) continues tobe respected and that the mechanism related thereto continues to be strengthened. TheSecretary-General believes that an effective mechanism to investigate allegations of theuse of chemical weapons can serve as an important deterrent against their employment.

Letter of Transmittal
The Hague. 13 September 2013

Sir. We have the honour to submit our report on the investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons on 21 August 2013 in the Ghouta area of Damascus in the Syrian Arab Republic. We also confirm that, in accordance with our terms of reference. we are continuing our investigation of allegations of other incidents involving the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and will repon thereon as soon as possible. At your request. and taking into account the large scale of the:! 1 August events in the Ghouta area of Damascus and the continued loss of civilian life. we are issuing the Gbouta report without prejudice to owr continuing investigation ot: and final report on. other allegations involving the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Having arrived in the Syrian Arab Republic on 18 August 2013, we were in Damascus on the 21 August preparing to conduct on-site inspections in connection with our investigation into the allegations concerining the use of chemical weapons in Khan al-Asal and in Sheik Maqsood and Saraqueb. Based on several reports of allegations on the use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013, you instructed us to focus our investigation efforts on the Ghouta allegations. We. therefore, proceeded to conduct on-site inspections in Moadamiyah in West Gbouta and Ein Tanna and Zcunalka in East Ghouta.

On the basis of the evidence obtained during our investigation of the Ghoula incident: the conclusion is that chemical weapons have been used in the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, also against civilians. including children. on a relatively large scaJe. ln particular, the enviromental chemical and medical samples. we have collected, provide clear and convincing evidence that surface-to-surface rockets containing the nerve agent sruin were used in Ein Tanna. Moadamiyah and Zamalka in the Ghouta area of Damascus. This result leaves us with the deepest concern.

We are grateful for the indispensable support provided by Ms. Angela Kane. the High Representative for Disannament. and the ilmumerable UN Secretariat officials who have assisted us in Nicosia, Beimt, Damasc·us, The Hague and New York.

Our work is only possible due to the indispensable contributions ofthe OPCW and the vVHO. We also deeply appreciate tbe efficient and effective assistance provided by the OPCW -designated laboratories in Finland. Germany, Sweden and Switzerland.

We also wish to thank you. Sir, for the confidence you have -placed in us.

We count on your and the others continued support as we continue and hopefully soon complete our investigation imto the other allegations.

Respectfully yours,


 * Professor Ake Sellström
 * (Head of Mission)


 * Mr Scott Cairns
 * (Head of and signing for the OPCW Component)


 * Dr MaUlizio Barbeschi
 * (Head of and signing for the WHO Component)

= UN Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic =

Report on Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 20 13

I. Termns of Reference
1. The Secretary-General decided to establish the UN Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic based on his authority under General Assembly resolution 42/37C and Security Council620 (1988). The purpose of this Mission is to ascertain the facts related to the allegations of use of chemical weapons and to gather relevant data and undertake the necessary analyses for this purpose and to deliver a report to the Secretary-General.

2. For the purpose of ascertaining the facts related to the allegations of use of chemical weapons, gathering relevant data and undertaking the necessary analyses, the Secretary General has requested the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ("OPCW'') to put its resources at his disposal, including providing a team of experts to conduct factfinding activities. The Secretary-General has also requested the World Health Organization ("WHO") to provide technical support in assessing the public health, clinical and event specific health aspects of the allegations that have been brought to his attention.

3. The~ UN Mission has conducted its investigation and all related activities in accordance with the terms of reference issued by the Secretary-General to the UN Mission including the above provisions as well as others on cooperation, methods of work and scope and reporting. As such, the terms of reference applied in respect of rts investigation of the Gouta allegations on which this report is submitted without prejudice to the continuing investigation of, and final report on, all allegations involving the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

4. In discharging its mandate, the Mission was guided by the United Nations Guidelines and Procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons (A/44/561) and, as appropriate and to the extent applicable, the OPCW provisions as identified in Article I(S)(a) of the Supplementary Arrangement to the Agreement concerning the Relationship between the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

5. Other relevant legal instruments governing the cooperation between the UN and the OPCW and WHO and guiding the work of the UN Mission are set out in Appendix I.

II. Methodological Considerations
6. In its investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta are of Damascus on 21 August 2013, the Mission visited Moadarniyah on 26 August 2013 and Ein Tarma and Zarnalka on 28-29 August. During its on-site visits, the UN Mission carried out the following activities:


 * Interviews with survivors and other witnesses;
 * Documentation of munitions and their sub-components;
 * Collection of environmental samples for subsequent analysis;
 * Assessment of symptoms of survivors;
 * Collection of hair, urine and blood samples for subsequent analysis;

7. Doi.ng so, the Mission adhered to the most stringent protocols available for such an investigation. Key to investigation methods of alleged use of chemical weapons are concepts like traceability, documentation, use of standardized and recognized procedures as well as relevant and up-to-date training of inspectors.

8. Traceability means that all processes and procedures are recorded and continuity is maintained for transparency and to withstand future scrutiny.

9. For example, the chain of custody procedures for sampling involved the following: The retrieval of samples is recorded and witnessed, samples are sealed, detailed documentation is prepared, transported to the preparatory laboratory under supervision of the members of the Mission, seals are confirmed and then broken, and the samples are representatively subdivided. The re-sealed samples are then distributed to the OPCW-designated laboratories with guidance documents, again, under the same supervision. The laboratories conduct their activities using standardized procedures (includjng quality assurance/quality control checks) for receiving, storing, and analyzing samples. The results are then returned under supervision to the investigation Mission for review. Each transfer of material is accompanied by handover receipts.

10. All information received, be it witness statements, pictures, videos, audios or patient records aJnd other documentation, is recorded and registered for filing and archiving with the United Nations.

11. Methods for interviews, sampling, and documentation follow well established standard operating procedures (SOPs), developed and enforced by the OPCW and the WHO and in accordance with the Guidelines.

12. Mission members are regularly trained and periodically updated on aspects of their respective specializations, including risk assessments, epidemiology, sampling, scene assessment, acquisition and processing of bio-medical samples, the performance of interviews, munition designs, unexploded ordnances, epidemiology as well as safety and security.

13. The selection process used was designed to primarily identify survivors who had severe clinical presentations, since these were also expected to have had significant exposure to the chemical agent. The ability to provide a sound history of the event and identify the alleged impact sites was also considered in selecting survivors.

14. The selection process was guided by a standardized checklist that aimed to identify individuals who either demonstrated moderate to severe symptoms and signs, or were able to provide a. clear and detailed history of the event. These survivors were requested to present to the local hospital on the day of the field visit to meet with the investigation Mission. Physicians at Zarnalka were also asked to provide a purposive sample of eight medical records of patients with significant symptoms and signs. Ill. NaUTative and Results of the Mission 15. Having arrived in the Syrian Arab Republic on 18 August 2013, we were in Damascus on the 21 August preparing to conduct on-site inspections in connection with our investiga1tion into the allegations concerning the use of chemical weapons in Khan al-Asal and in Sheik Maqsood and Saraqueb. Based on several reports of allegations on the use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta area ofDamascus on 21 August 2013, you instructed us to focus our investigation efforts on the Ghouta allegations. We, therefore, proceeded to conduct on-site inspections in Moadarniyah in West Ghouta and Ein Tarma and Zarnalka in East Ghouta. 16. Pursuant to the joint understanding reached with the Syrian Government and separate arrangements agreed on an ad-hoc basis with the other parties to the conflict, a temporary ceasefire was effectively in place for five hours daily between 26-29 August. 17. The planning of this mission was therefore complex and highly delicate. The time window for operations was determined by actual hours of access. The route of entry into the areas remained uncertain until the tinal moments. Finally, the tmderstanding of what the Mission c:ould be expected to find once in opposition-controlled area was also uncertain. Crucial elements for the planning, such as the number of patients affected or the surface area covered by the attacks remained undefined until the actual arrival ofthe Mjssion on the affected s.ites. (For more information on preparation of the mission see Appendix 3). 18. On 26 August, the Mission visited Moadamiyah of West Ghouta for two hours. On 28- 29 August the Mission visited Zarnalka and Ein Tarma of East Ghouta for a total time of five and a half hours. In spite of the imposed time constraints, and repeated threats ofhann, including an actual attack on the convoy by an unidentified sniper on 26 August, the Mission was none1theless able to gather a considerable amount of information and to collect the necessary amount of samples. 19. The Mission was also able to collect primary statements from more than fifty exposed survjvors including patients, health workers and first-responders. Based on these statements and the information gathered from various reports, the surface-to-surface rockets impacted in the early morning hours of21 August. 20. Survivors reported an attack with shelling, followed by the onset of a common range of symptoms, including shortness ofbreath, disorientation, rhinorrhea (runny nose), eye irritation, blurred vision, nausea, vomiting, general weakness, and eventual loss of consciousness. Those who went to assist other community members described seeing a large number o.f individuals lying on the ground, many of whom were deceased or unconscious. These individuals reported observing labored breathing and excessive salivation among a large proportion ofthe survivors. Several of these "first responders" also became ill, with one describing the onset of blurred vision, generalized weakness, shaking, a sensation of impending doom, followed by fainting.

21. Nime nurses and seven treating physicians were interviewed by the Mission. Most were at their respective homes at the time of incident, with several responding immediately to assist exposed :individuals at the site of the incident. Those clinicians who responded in the field described seeing a large number of ill or deceased persons lying in the streets without external signs of injury. Most survivors were described as being unconscious, with many demonstrating laboured breathing. The responders attempted to assist the survivors through the provision of first aid, decontamination with water where possible, and transfer to the nearest hospital by whatever means possible - usually by private car. Weather· conditions in Damascus on 21 August: 22. Weather infotmation from Damascus on the morning of21 August shows a falling temperature between 0200h and 0500h in the morning (Worldweatheronline.com). This means that the air is not moving from the ground upwards, but rather the opposite. Chemical weapons use in such meteorological conditions maximizes their potential impact as the heavy gas can stay close to the ground and penetrate into lower levels of buildings and constructions where many people were seeking shelter. Informaltion about munitions: 23. Information gathered about the delivery systems used was essential for the investigation. lndeed, s1everal surface to surface rockets capable of delivering significant chemical payloads were identified and recorded at the investigated sites. These were carefully measured, photographed and sampled. Samples later confirmed to contain Sarin were recovered from a majority of the rockets or rocket fragments. For more detailed information and assessments see Appendix 5. lnforma1tion concerning environmental samples: 24. In total, 30 environmental samples were recovered during the investigation. The samples were take:n from impact sites and surrounding areas (See Appendix 6 for further specifications). Samples were subsequently processed and sent for analysis. According to the reports received from the OPCW -designated laboratories, the presence of Sarin, its degradation and/or production by-products were observed in a majority of the samples. In addition, other relevant chemicals, such as stabilizers are indicated and discussed in Appendix 7. Information concerning symptoms: 25. The Mission requested to see 80 survivors who met the criteria established by the Mission. Of the 80 presented the Mission selected 36 who were diagnosed by the medical experts of the Mission. Patients clearly showed symptoms, such as: loss of consciousness (78%), shortness of breath (61 %), blurred vision ( 42%), eye irritation/inflammation (22%), excessive salivation (22%), vomiting (22%), and convulsions/seizures (19%). These symptoms are consistent with an organophosphate intoxication. For a more full discussion of the symptoms see Appendix 4.

fnformattion concerning bio-medical samples: 26. Blood, urine and hair samples. were withdrawn from 34 of the 36 patients selected by the Mission who had signs of intoxication. The positive blood and urine specimens provide definitive: evidence of exposure to Sarin by almost all of the survivors assessed by the Mission. These results are corroborated by the clinical assessments, whkh documented symptoms and signs that are consistent with nerve agent exposure, including shortness of breath, eye irritation, excessive salivation, convulsions, confusion/disorientation, and miosis. The tlndings of the clinical assessments were consistent with information derived from both the interviews with clinicians and the review of medical records, which each reported symptoms and signs consistent with nerve agent exposure. The results of the biomedical samples are discussed in Appendix 4 and displayed in Appendix 7. Conclusions 27. On the basis of the evidence obtained during our investigation ofthe Ghouta incident, the concllusion is that, on 21 August 2013, chemical weapons have been used in the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, also against civilians, including children, on a relatively large scale. 28. In particular, the environmental, chemical and medical samples we have collected provide clear and convincing evidence that surface-to-surface rockets containing the nerve agent Sarin were used in Ein Tarma, Moadamiyah and Zamalka in the Ghouta area of Damascus. 29. The facts supporting this conclusion are: • Impacted and exploded surface-to-surface rockets, capable to carry a chemical payload, were found to contain Sarin. • Close to the rocket impact sites, in the area where patients were affected, the environment was found to be contaminated by Sarin. • Over fifty interviews given by survivors and health care workers provided ample corroboration of the medical and scientific results. • A number of patients/survivors were clearly diagnosed as intoxicated by an organophosphorous compound. • Blood and urine samples from the same patients were found positive for Sarin and Sarin signatures. 30. This result leaves us with the deepest concern.

Appendices
Appendix 1: Relevant Legal Instruments

Appendix 2: Methodology Used in the Investigation and Securing Evidences

Appendix 3: Planning and Preparing for Entries into the Areas to be Investigated

Appendix 4: Bio-medical Fact Finding Activities

Appendix 5: Munitions Recovered in Moadamiyah and Zamalka/Ein Tarma

Appendix 6: Environmental Samples Collected in Moadamiyah and Zamalka/Ein Tarma

Appendix 7: Results fi·om Laboratory Analysis

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